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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD P. S1f00T and 
B""\RBARA l\1. SMOOT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs.-
HOWARD L. LUND and 
GWEN C. LUND, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents do not concur in the Preliminary State-
ment or Statement of Facts as propounded by the Appel-
lants, because these ''statements'' embrace conclusions 
and allegations of the Appellants which are supported 
only by the unverified pleading of the Appellants; fur-
ther, the Statement of Facts erroneously considers the 
facts alleged in the unverified Amended Complaint as 
established for purposes of this appeal. The Respond-
ents also consider facts essential in a consideration of 
this case to have been omitted. 
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According to the notice of appeal filed by the plain-
tiffs (appellants) herein, they appeal (1) from the sum-
mary judgment entered on June 5, 1961, in favor of 
defendants (respondents), (2) from the order of the 
court denying plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the sum-
mary judgment and for a new trial, and (3) from the 
court's order granting defendants' Motion to Strike 
entered March 23, 1961. (R. 66) However, there is serious 
doubt that the brief of the plaintiffs is directed at (2) or 
(3) above, and we must conclude therefore that the appeal 
insofar as it relates to these points has been abandoned. 
In fact, our examination of the record fails to reveal that 
plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the summary judgment 
and for a new trial has been denied. 
On or about February 9, 1959, the defendants exe-
cuted a promissory note in favor of Richard P. Smoot, 
promising to pay $27,500.00 on or before February 10, 
1961, and agreeing to certain further conditions regard-
ing payment and security therefor (R. 7, 8); on the due 
date the balance of the original sum then owing was 
$15,200.00. (R. 34, 35) 
Hardly had the promissory note had time to meta-
morphose from time to demand paper, when counsel for 
the plaintiffs, on Saturday, February 11, 1961, executed 
a complaint against defendants, claiming as a second 
cause of action that the promissory note in question did 
not express the actual agreement of the parties by rea-
son of mutual mistake, or mistake of plaintiffs and fraud 
of both defendants. (R. 3) The plaintiffs prayed for (1) 
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reformation of the instrument; (2) judgment for the bal-
ance due, and {3) exemplary damages. 
On March 6, 1961, plaintiffs secured a writ of attach+ 
ment, attaching the property of the defendants. 
(R. 11, 16) 
Thereupon, the defendants moved to strike all pro-
visions of plaintiffs' second cause of action alleging or 
inferring fraud, and upon which they claim exemplary 
damages· (R. 14) which motion was granted. (R. 21) 
On March 30, 1961, and April 10, 1961, the balance 
due on the promissory note was tendered to plaintiffs 
by defendants (R. 34), but the plaintiffs objected to the 
form of the tender and requested "the cash or cashier's 
check be formally tendered or paid into court.'' (R. 36) 
Defendants' motion to deposit the balance due under 
the note (R. 38), and for summary judgment on plaintiffs' 
second cause of action (R. 37) was granted by the court 
on June 5, 1961, following hearing on May 23, 1961 (R. 55, 
56), the actual deposit being made on the latter date. 
(R. 52) 
The motions of the defendants to strike the fraud 
allegations, and for summary judgment, granted by the 
court, relate solely to plaintiffs' second cause of action 
as contained in the original complaint. The amended com-
plaint of the plaintiff was not the basis for the motions 
aforementioned. Repeated reference to the amended 
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complaint by the appellants as forming a part of this 
appeal is not supported by the record. 
We submit that the amended complaint of plaintiffs 
is not before the court on this appeal; however, should 
this court conclude otherwise, the arguments made here-
after apply with equal force to the amended complaint 
as to the original complaint. 
The respondents claim the lower court did not err in 
granting the motions which are the subject of this appeal, 
for the following reasons : 
1. Plaintiffs, by securing a writ of attachment, and 
attaching the property of defendants, have elected a rem-
edy in contract, according to the terms of the promissory 
note; they are barred from the remedies of reformation 
or exemplary damages arising from alleged tortious con-
duct of the defendants. 
2. Defendants have made a valid tender in satisfac-
tion of plaintiffs' second cause of action, and plaintiffs 
failed to comply with the Utah law regarding due objec-
tion thereto. 
3. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was 
duly supported by affidavit; plaintiffs failed to file a 
traverse thereto. 
4. Plaintiffs have failed to plead a cause of action 
for reformation of the promissory note in question. 
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5. Plaintiffs are not entitled to reformation of the 
promissory note inasmuch as no demand was made for 
reformation of the instrument until this action was filed. 
STATMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
PLAINTIFFS BY THEIR ELECTION HAVE 
AFFIRMED THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND 
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES OR 
REFORMATION. 
PoiNT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
GRANTED IN VIEW OF PLAINTIFFS' FAlL-
URE TO TRAVERSE DEFENDANTS' PROOF. 
PoiNT III 
DEFENDANTS HAVE MADE A LAWFUL 
AND BINDING TENDER IN SATISFACTION 
OF THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
PoiNT IV 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD A 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORMATION OF 
THE PROMISSORY NOTE IN ISSUE. 
PoiNT V 
PLAINTIFFS' COl\IPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE 
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO ALLEGE A DE-
MAND FOR CORRECTION OF THE PROM-
ISSORY NOTE, AND REFUSAL THEREOF. 
PoiNT VI 
THE PLAI~TIFFS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW 
THE LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
PLAINTIFFS BY THEIR ELECTION HAVE 
AFFIRMED THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND 
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES OR 
REFORMATION. 
It is elementary that a litigant must choose between 
two or more available remedies which are inconsistent. 
The Utah case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 
(Utah) 253 P. 196, states the rule as follows: 
''The doctrine of an election rests upon the prin-
ciple that one may not take contrary positions, and 
where he has a right to choose one of two modes 
of redress, and the two are so inconsistent that 
the assertion of one involves a negation or repu-
diation of the other, the deliberate and settled 
choice of one, with knowledge or means of knowl-
edge of such facts as would authorize a resort to 
each, will preclude him thereafter from going back 
and electing again. * * * '' 
In the instant case the plaintiffs in their second cause 
of action ask for three remedies, growing out of the same 
allegations, namely: (1) a judgment for the balance due 
on the promissory note; (2) exemplary damages for the 
alleged tort of the defendants and (3) reformation of the 
said note. It is obvious that these remedies are incon-
sistent in nature, the remedy in (1) being based upon 
affirmance of the promissory note; \vhile (2) is an action 
ex delicto; and (3) is an action in equity in disaffirmance 
of the contract. 
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Following the filing of the complaint, the plain-
tiffs chose to attach the property of the defendants. (R. 
11, 12, 16, 17) 
Rule 640 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides for the extraordinary remedy of attachment as 
follows: 
''The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of 
the complaint, in an action upon a judgment, upon 
any contract express or implied, or in an action to 
recover damages for any tort committed by a non-
resident of this state against the person or prop-
erty of a resident of this state, may have the 
property of the defendant, not exempt from execu-
tion, attached as security for the satisfaction of 
any judgment that may be recovered in such 
action, * * *. ' ' 
Three actions, therefore, will support an attachment, 
to wit : ( 1) An action upon a Judgment; ( 2) An action 
upon any contract, express or implied; and (3) An action 
to recover damages for any tort committed by a nonresi-
dent of this state against the person or property of a resi-
dent of this state. This case before the court involves no 
action upon a judgment, nor an action to recover dam-
ages for any tort committed by a nonresident, for plain-
tiffs specifically admit that defendants are residents of 
Utah. (R. 2) Therefore, the attachment by the defend-
ants in this case must have been '' * * * in an action 
upon * * * [a] contract, express or implied * * *.'' 
By the attachment of defendants' property, we sub-
mit that plaintiffs have elected a remedy based upon con-
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tract and have waived any action in tort for exemplary 
damages or any action in equity for reformation of the 
instrument. The test of whether there has been a con-
clusive election has been stated by this court as follows: 
"The true rule seems to be (1) that there must be, 
in fact, two or more coexisting remedies upon 
which the party has the right to elect; (2) the rem-
edies thus open to him must be alternative and 
inconsistent; and (3) he must by actually bringing 
an action or by some other decisive act, with knowl-
edge of the facts, indicate his choice between these 
inconsistent remedies. * * * (Emphasis added) 
See Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., (Utah) 253 P. 196. 
According to 18 Am. Jur., Election of Remedies, 
p. 164: 
''The doctrine of election of remedies is fully 
applicable where one of the modes of redress 
chosen is attachment or garnishment.'' 
That resort by the plaintiffs to the extraordinary 
writ of attachment constitutes a waiver of an action in 
tort for exemplary damages is sustained by ample au-
thority. See 4 Am. Jur., Attachment and Garnishment, 
Section 15, p. 560 ; Steiner v. Rowley, (Calif.) 221 P. 2d 
9; Estrada v. Alvarez, (Calif.) 240 P. 2d 278; Cleveland v. 
San Antonio Building and Loan Association et at., 
(Texas) 223 S. W. 2d 226; Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. 
S. S. Co. v. Stewart (La.) 44 So. 138; Sta;n.hope v. Swaf-
ford (Iowa) 42 N.W. 450; ~~fcC all v. Superior Court 
(Calif.) 36 P. 2d 642. 
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Steiner v. Rowley (Calif.) 221 P. 2d 9, was an action 
to recover a broker's commission, in which plaintiffs 
pleaded alternative causes in tort and contract. The plain-
tiffs in addition to pleading the inconsistent counts ob-
tained an attachment. The court stated: 
''Pleading the two causes of action in the alterna-
tive did not constitute an election because inconsis-
tent counts are permissible, * * * (citing cases) 
• * * and an election cannot be forced by demurrer. 
• • • But the Steiners also obtained an attach-
ment. This was a positive act of a plaintiff 'in 
pursuit of * * * (the contractual remedy) * * * 
whereby he has gained * * * advantage over the 
other party * . ' De Laval Pac. Co. v. United C. 
& D. Co., 65 Cal. App. 584, 586, 224 P. 766, 767. The 
Steiners were thereafter estoppel (sic) to allege a 
cause of action in tort, and the demurrer as to the 
fourth count was properly sustained.'' 
We submit that exemplary damages are not recover-
able in actions for breach of contract; and even though a 
tortious act may be shown, if the action proceeds on 
the contractual obligation no exemplary damages are 
recoverable. 
According to Engen v. Mercha;nts' and Manufac-
turers State Bank (Minn.) 204 N.W. 963: 
''An action to recover damages for fraud inducing 
the making of a contract is not based on the con-
tract but on tort.'' 
The Utah case of Haycraft v. Adams, 82 Utah 347, 
24 P. 2d 1110, defines exemplary damages as follows: 
'' 'Exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages are 
such damages as are in excess of the actual loss, 
and are allowed where a tort is aggravated by 
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evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence, op-
pression or fraud.' l\1 urphy v. Booth, 36 Utah 
285, 103 p. 768, 770.'' 
The plaintiffs by virtue of the attachment aforemen-
tioned have made a conclusive election to proceed ex con-
tractu and have waived all right to recover the damages 
claimed for the alleged tort of the defendants. See Steiner 
v. Rowley, supra. The lower court properly awarded sum-
mary judgment for the balance due under the note in 
question, there being no further basis for recovery under 
the contract. 
The remedy of reformation of the promissory note 
as sought by the plaintiffs is equally inconsistent with 
the election of attachment in an action upon an express 
contract, the promissory note. The two remedies are in-
consistent, the action for reformation disaffirming the con-
tract, and the attachment being a redress in affirmance 
thereof. See in this connection 18 Am. Jur., Election of 
Remedies, Sections 29, 30, p. 150, Section 33, p. 154; M on-
talbano v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn. 
( S. Car.) 62 S.E. 2d 829; H a1lidie v. Enginger (Calif.) 
166 P. 1; Continental Grain Cor;npany v. The First Na-
tional Bank of Memphis, et al., 162 F. Supp. 814; Leaks-
ville Light and Pou·er Co. Y. Georgia Casualty Co. (X. 
Car.) 137 S.E. 817. Furthermore, the plaintiffs haYe shared 
in benefits or the fruits of the agreement, having received 
$12,300 in payments under the note, and by virtue thereof 
have recognized the express terms of that instrument. 
The order of the lower court, dated March 23, 1961 
(R. 21) granted defendants' motion to strike all provis-
ions of plaintiffs' second cause of action alleging or 
10 
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inferring fraud. Plaintiffs' brief in no wise challenges 
this order; the inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that 
the allegation or ground of fraud upon which the 
plaintiffs claim reformation is no longer before the court. 
By attaching the property of the defendants, the 
plaintiffs elected to affirm the promissory note. The or-
ders of the court granting defendants' motion to strike 
the fraud allegations of plaintiffs' second cause of action 
and the motion for summary judgment were not in error 
in view of the election of remedy by the plaintiffs and the 
tender of the balance due on the promissory note by 
the defendants. 
PoiNT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
GRANTED IN VIEW OF PLAINTIFFS' FAlL-
URE TO TRAVERSE DEFENDANTS' PROOF. 
The defendants' motion for summary judgment was 
made pursuant to Rule 56, of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Proceedure. Rule 56 (a) thereof provides: 
''A party seeking to recover upon a claim, coun-
terclaim or cross claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
20 days from the commencement of the action or 
after service of a motion for summary judgment 
by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor upon all or any part thereof.'' 
The motion of the defendants' was supported by af-
fidavit to the effect that defendants had offered to pay 
by cashier's check $15,200, the full balance due on the 
promissory note in question, plus interest to the date of 
11 
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payment; that plaintiffs' attorney had objected to the 
form of the tender; and that no presentment or demand 
was made after the due date except by the service of 
process. ( R. 34, 35) 
As indicated in this brief heretofore we contend that 
plaintiffs elected a remedy in contract; therefore, the 
only question of fact before the lower court was the obli-
gation due under the promissory note in question. By 
affidavit the defendants have established the balance due 
thereunder, refusal of the plaintiffs to accept the same, 
and the record indicates the deposit in court of that sum 
pursuant to request of the plaintiffs. (R. 52, 36) 
In Dupler v. Yates, (Utah), 351 P. 2d 624, this court 
held: 
''Certainly if the summary judgment procedure 
is to be effective, it must be held that when ade-
quate proof is submitted in support of the motion, 
the pleadings are not sufficient to raise an issue of 
fact. 
Upon motion for summary judgment, the courts 
ought to recognize, a.s a minimum, that the oppos-
ing party produce some evidentiary matter in con-
tradiction of the movant's case or specify in an 
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so.'' 
See also Pender v. ~tlix (Utah) 354 P. 2d 1066. 
Plaintiffs in this case :filed no traverse to the affidavit 
of the defendants in support of the motion for summary 
judgment, and all of the allegations of plaintiffs in their 
12 
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eomplaint are unverified. The court therefore had no 
issue of fact before it, and properly awarded summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. 
PoiNT III 
DEFENDANTS HAVE MADE A LAWFUL 
AND BINDING TENDER IN SATIS~ACTION 
OF THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
On March 30, 1961, and again on April 10, 1961, de-
fendants, by letter, tendered the balance and interest due 
under the promissory note in question to plaintiffs. (R. 
34) The letter of April 10, 1961, reads in part: 
''You will please take notice that Howard L. Lund 
and Gwen C. Lund offer to pay, by cashier's check 
the sum of $15,200 plus interest to date of payment 
in full payment and satisfaction of that note in 
favor of Richard P. Smoot dated February 9, 
1959, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Lund." (R. 35) 
The reply of plaintiffs stated in part : 
'' * * * I wish to object to the form of the tender 
and request that the cash or cashier's check be for-
mally tendered or paid into court." (R. 36) 
Sections 78-27-1 and 3, U. C. A. 1953, provide : 
78-27-1. ''An offer in writing to pay a particular 
sum of money or to deliver a written instrument 
or specific personal property, is, if not accepted, 
equivalent to the actual production and tender of 
the money, instrument or property.'' 
78-27-3. ''The person to whom a tender is made 
must, at the time, specify any objection he may 
13 
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have to the money, instrument or property, or he 
is deemed to have waived it; and, if the objection 
is to the amount of money, the terms of the instru-
ment or the amount or kind of property, he must 
specify the amounts, terms or kind which he re-
quires, or be precluded from objection after-
wards.'' 
Plaintiffs made no objection to the amount of money 
tendered, nor did they specify the amounts or terms re-
quired. In view of Section 78-27-3, supra, plaintiffs can-
not now object to the amount of money tendered, for their 
failure to object constitutes a waiver thereof. 
Appellants' brief, particularly Point I thereof, com-
pletely overlooks or avoids the legal principle applicable 
here and becomes entangled in an analysis of Rule 68 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which rule has no 
relation to this case. The defendants tendered the sums 
in question pursuant to Sections 78-27-1 and 3, supra, and 
deposited the actual monies in court pursuant to Section 
78-27-4, U. C. A. 1953. Plaintiffs then failed to make 
timely objections to the tenders made, other than as to 
form; wherein can the plaintiffs now complain~ 
The fact of the tenders aforementioned was made 
part of the affidavit which supported defendants' motion 
for summary judgment. (R. 37) Plaintiffs, for reasons 
best known to them, failed to traverse the affidavit. 
We respectfully submit granting summary judgment 
under such circumstances was anything but error. 
14 
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PoiNT IV 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD A 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORMATION OF 
THE PROMISSORY NOTE IN ISSUE. 
Persuasive authority supports the legal principle 
that a moving party in a suit for reformation must nega-
tive negligence. The case of Cherokee Oil and Gas Co. 
v. Lucky Leaf Oil and Gas Co., 116 Okla. 121, 242 Pac. 
214, supports the conclusion that an allegation that a writ-
ten instrument does not express the contract of the par-
ties, in an action for reformation, does not state a cause 
of action, unless the pleader negatives negligence on his 
part. In that case the court held : 
'' * * * The pleader is not entitled to reformation, 
unless he shows himself free from negligence in 
attaching his signature to the written agreement, 
if he claims that it does not express the true 
agreement of the parties. The pleader must show 
that he was not guilty of a want of ordinary care 
for the protection of his own business interest at 
the time he attached his signature to the written 
agreement. * * * '' 
The Cherokee case is applicable here. The plaintiffs 
do not negative negligence on their part in seeking refor-
mation. Plaintiffs must show they are not guilty of want 
of ordinary care in conveying valuable consideration for 
the note in question. This they have not done and their 
second cause of action fails to state a cause of action for 
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The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in Gar-
ner v. Thoma-s, et a.l., 94 Utah 295, 78 P. 2d 529, is poignant 
to the legal proposition here advocated, wherein it is 
stated: 
'' * * * There is a division of authority on the ques-
tion of whether the moving party in a suit for 
reformation must negative negligence or only 
gross negligence. See the well considered notes in 
28 L. R. A., N. S. 882; 45 ALR 700; 65 Am. St. Rep. 
485 ; 23 R. C. L. 360. 
"* * * Reams v. McMinville, 153 Tenn. 408, 284 
S. W. 382, 384 lays down the sensible rule that, 
'The pleader must explain how the mistake was 
made, and show that he was without fault in the 
matter.' In Cochran v. Burns, 91 N. J. Eq. 7, 107 
A. 476, it is held that a complaint was good al-
though no facts or statements as to how the mis-
take occurred are included, except that it was a ma-
terial mistake and the written agreement was not 
the intended agreement. If this case decides that 
the pleading need not negative negligence, it 
sta;nds almost alone. 
''Seemingly in this state the rule is that reforma-
tion of a written instrument will not be decreed 
where the party seeking reformation is guilty of 
negligence only. Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah 
114, 60 P. 2d 1115; George v. Fritsch Loan & Trust 
Co., 69 Utah 460, 256 P. 400. * * *" (Emphasis 
added) 
We recognize the apparent conflict in authorities as 
to whether the moving party in a suit must negative neg-
ligence or only gross negligence. We submit that the cases 
herein cited support the better rule requiring the negativ-
ing of negligence. In any event, the plaintiffs, in pleading 
for reformation, negatiYe neither negligence nor gross 
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negligence; in such failure they do not state a cause of 
action for reformation. Therefore, the summary judg-
ment was properly granted. 
PoiNT V 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE 
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO ALLEGE A DE-
l\IAND FOR CORRECTION OF THE PROM-
ISSORY NOTE, AND REFUSAL THEREOF. 
According to 45 Am. Jur., Reformation of Instru-
ments, Section 104, p. 646 : 
''A complaint for reformation must allege a de-
mand upon the defendant for correction of the 
instrument and a refusal thereof, unless the case 
is brought within an exception to the general rule, 
as where from the facts alleged it appears that a 
demand would have been a useless ceremony.'' 
Cleveland v. Bateman, (N. M.), 158 P. 648. 
In the instant case the complaint alleges no demand 
for correction, or refusal thereof, nor is there a showing 
that the demand would have been a useless act. The action 
for reformation is the main purpose of the second cause 
of action, an integral part of the lawsuit, and not such a 
mere incident to the action of the plaintiffs so as to relieve 
them of the necessity of pleading the demand and refusal. 
In this connection it is observed that the complaint 
of plaintiffs is the first and only request for reformation 
- and this comes two years after the receipt of the 
promissory note by plaintiffs; the day after the promis-
17 
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sory note has matured by its own terms; and at a time 
subsequent to part performance of the promissory note 
by defendants, and retention thereof by the plaintiffs. 
Reformation being equitable relief requires good faith, 
diligence, and clean hands on the part of the moving 
party. We question the standing of the plaintiffs to 
urge at this time, and under the conditions noted, the 
remedy of reformation; and in this respect we submit 
the summary judgment was properly granted. 
PoiNT VI 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW 
THE LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
It is fundamental that one prosecuting an appeal has 
the burden to show error. By virtue of the authorities 
and reasoning heretofore cited we submit the lower court 
properly granted summary judgment, and we also sub-
mit that plaintiffs have failed to discharge their burden. 
We are of the conviction that all matters raised in 
appellants' brief have been met in the points set forth 
heretofore, and that plaintiffs in prosecuting their appeal 
have ignored the doctrine of election or remedies, rules 
concerning summary judgment, and the necessary requi-
sites for the relief of reformation. In addition, thereto, 
however, other deficiencies are noted in the appeal 
procedure. 
First, no appeal has been taken from the order of the 
lower court, dated June 5, 1961 (R,. 56, 57). This order 
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grants the motion to deposit tender and requires certain 
releases of property and security, and grants summary 
judgment. We submit the plaintiffs are bound by that 
order regardless of this appeal, which makes this prosecu-
tion a useless act. 
Second, as heretofore noted, the plaintiffs' brief has 
failed to show any error in the lower court's order grant-
ing defendants' motion to strike the allegations of fraud 
in the second cause of action. (R. 21) These allegations 
therefore are not properly before this court, and the 
plaintiffs' attempt in the resurrection thereof in their 
brief is defective. 
Third, we have heretofore submitted that all deter-
minations of the lower court before this court on appeal 
related to the second cause of action of the original com-
plaint. The order granting the motion to strike (R. 21) 
and the summary judgment (R. 55) so indicate. In plain-
tiffs' brief we now note the inclusion of matters which 
arise in the amended complaint of the plaintiffs, which 
was not filed until the same day the motion for summary 
judgment was argued, May 23, 1961. (R. 42-51, 56) 
In the brief of appellants, Point II(B), it is claimed 
that the lower court erred in dismissing as a matter of 
law the claim of plaintiffs to counsel fees and costs, be-
cause of the alleged omission in the note of any provision 
allowing attorneys' fees in event of default and collec-
tion. No law is cited by the plaintiffs in support of 
this proposition. Furthermore, this claim to attorneys' 
fees and costs is entirely foreign to the original complaint. 
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Fourth, the basis upon which it is claimed that Plain-
tiff Barbara M. Smoot is entitled to anything under the 
second cause of action is not readily apparent. She was 
not even a party to the transaction. 
The record does not show that defendant Gwen C. 
Lund took any part in the incidents of the negotiations 
which are termed fraudulent by plaintiffs. How can plain-
tiffs under any condition contend that she is not entitled 
to the summary judgment~ 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court did not err in granting summary 
judgment and the defendants' motion to strike, and de-
fendants therefore pray for affirmance of the decision of 
the lower court and costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRANMER, McGARRY & LUND 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
RAYMOND W. GEE 
366 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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